Intentional Act Ruled an ‘Accident’ For Victim in Car Insurance Claim
September 22, 2008
The death of a Manhattan litigator who was struck by a car driven by a man seeking to kill as many pedestrians as possible was an “accident” for insurance purposes, even though the driver’s actions were intentional, a divided appeals court has ruled.
For policy provisions that do not explicitly exclude intentional acts, the issue of whether an automotive “event” is an “accident” should be viewed from the perspective of the victim, not the errant driver, the majority of an Appellate Division, Second Department, panel concluded in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Langan, 15384/02.
…At the onset of their opinion, the majority stated that they agreed with Justice Parga that Mr. Spicehandler was not covered by the policy’s uninsured-motorist provision, which explicitly excludes intentional acts.
“[T]he mandatory coverage afforded under an uninsured motorist endorsement is meant to be coextensive with, and therefore no greater than, the standard coverage that would ordinarily be available to the uninsured motorist had he or she been insured,” Justice Fisher wrote. “Plainly, no standard automobile liability policy would have provided coverage to Popadich for the injuries he intentionally inflicted on Spicehandler.”
However, Mr. Langan is entitled to benefits under the sections that do not explicitly exclude such acts, the panel concluded.
“[F]rom Spicehandler’s point of view, the incident that caused his injuries and death was certainly ‘unexpected, unusual and unforeseen,’ and was not the result of any ‘misconduct, provocation, or assault’ on his part,” Justice Fisher wrote.
“Consequently, the question of whether or not Popadich acted with criminal intent, although critical to the issue of coverage under the uninsured motorist endorsement, was entirely irrelevant to State Farm’s obligation here to provide coverage under the subject policy’s mandatory personal injury protection endorsement, and its death, dismemberment, and loss of sight provisions, neither of which contain a specific exclusion for injury or death caused by an intentional act.”
Justices David S. Ritter (See Profile) and William E. McCarthy (See Profile) joined the opinion.
Justice William F. Mastro (See Profile) dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice Edward D. Carni (See Profile).
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