A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 50331(U)(App. Term, 2d, 2009)
A provider generally establishes its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by [*2]proof of the submission of a statutory claim form, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law ยง 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]). A review of the record indicates that the affidavit submitted by plaintiffs’ billing manager sufficed to establish that the annexed claim forms constituted evidence in admissible form (see CPLR 4518; Fortune Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50243[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Consequently, the record establishes plaintiffs’ prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.
In opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted, inter alia, that the alleged injuries do not arise out of an insured incident (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 201 [1997]). In support of said defense, defendant submitted the affidavit of its litigation examiner, the police report, the affidavit of its investigator, and transcripts of statements made by the assignors and the insured, which demonstrated that defendant possessed a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. at 199).
Richard Morgan D.O., P.C. v GEICO Indem. Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 50332(U)(App. Term, 2d, 2009)
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), limiting issues of fact for trial. Plaintiff’s attorney and its billing manager each claimed that plaintiff’s bills were denied based upon independent medical examinations (IMEs), that defendant failed to produce the IME reports upon plaintiff’s request and that, therefore, defendant should be precluded from asserting its defense of lack of medical necessity. In opposition, defendant argued that it timely denied plaintiff’s claims on the ground that the services rendered [*2]were not medically necessary and attached copies of the IME reports to its opposition papers, as well as affidavits executed by the chiropractor and the acupuncturist who performed the IMEs at issue. Defendant also requested an order limiting issues for trial pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g) in the event plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied. The District Court denied the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment and implicitly denied the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), as well as defendant’s request for such an order. The instant appeal by plaintiff ensued.
Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal with respect to the denial of that branch of its motion seeking judgment in its favor is that defendant should be precluded from asserting its defense of lack of medical necessity because defendant did not provide copies of the IME reports in response to the request for said reports contained in plaintiff’s complaint. However, as the motion court held, “a pleading can only contain statements’ and cannot contain a demand or request” (see CPLR 3013, 3014). Accordingly, plaintiff has not demonstrated that it ever made a proper demand for the IME reports. In any event, the Insurance Regulations provide no sanction for an insurer’s failure to provide an IME report upon the written request for one by a provider (see Careplus Med. Supply, Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 18 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Consequently, the District Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
However, the alternative relief sought in plaintiff’s motion, which relief plaintiff seeks again on this appeal, is appropriate in this case (see CPLR 3212 [g]; Tele-Pac, Inc. v Grainger, 168 AD2d 11 [1991]; E.B. Metal & Rubber Indus. v County of Washington, 102 AD2d 599 [1984]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3212:35). As defendant has not challenged the admissibility of plaintiff’s claim forms as business records, and the parties agree that the only issue for trial is whether the services billed for were medically necessary, we find, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff submitted its claim forms to defendant and that defendant timely denied the claims at issue based upon independent medical examinations performed by Dominic Chiappetta and Richard Sollazzo.
We decline defendant’s request that we search the record and award it summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see e.g. New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 832 [2007]).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Cyriaque, 2009 NY Slip Op 50334(U)(App. Term, 2d, 2009)
A party seeking to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see also Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333 [1994]). While the determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court (see Grutman v Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners’ Assn., 207 AD2d 526, 527 [1994]; Bergdorf Goodman Inc. v Hillard, 1 Misc 3d 127[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51544[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]), reversal is warranted where the motion court has improvidently exercised its discretion (see Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568 [1997]). Furthermore, where the record demonstrates a pattern of default or neglect, the default should be considered intentional and, therefore, not excusable (see Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky, 283 AD2d 553 [2001]). In the instant case, defendant’s consistent and repeated defaults demonstrated a pattern of neglect, and the default should not be excused. We conclude that it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the Civil Court to have granted defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
State Farm Ins. Co. v German, 2009 NY Slip Op 50335(U)(App. Term, 2d, 2009)
We note that in view of our finding that defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the default, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue of whether a meritorious defense was demonstrated.
Velen Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 50343(U)(App. Term, 2d, 2009)
On appeal, defendant argues that the affidavit by plaintiff’s billing manager, submitted in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers and that, as a result, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. We agree. The affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s billing manager was insufficient to demonstrate that she possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s
[*2]practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (
see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 144[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51161[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007],
affd 55 AD3d 644 [2008];
Bath Med. Supply, Inc. v Deerbrook Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 135[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50179[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007];
Dan Med. P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. We note that no issue is raised with respect to the denial of defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment.
Friendly Physician, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 50348(U)(App. Term, 2d, 2009)
The appeal from the order is dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of a judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).